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The Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), the music
industry's trade and lobbying group, recently initiated a controversial tactic
to bring to surface previously anonymous digital pirates of the Internet.
This aggressive tactic aims to make safe the digital oceans for copyright
and involves identifying and bringing claims against infringing individuals
who download, swap, and/or post copyrighted music illegally via the
Internet. The RIAA cares not who the infringers are or whether the
infringers know the illegality of their actions. Nor does the music industry
concern itself with the inevitable storm of backlash bound to fall upon them
for suing uninformed or unintentional infringers. Internet users and
privacy advocates, however, care all too much. This i-brief attempts to
alleviate the fears of privacy infringement by bringing to light certain
safeguards built into the Digital Millennium Copyrights Act (“DMCA”) to
deal with the possibility of both fraudulent identity subpoenas and
infringement into personal privacy. In addition, case law will show that the
subpoena powers of the DMCA will not be abused by those who truly wish
to enforce copyright laws and legitimate claims of ownership, thereby
maintaining the privacy of law abiding Internet users.

MUSIC INDUSTRY FILES SUITS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL INFRINGERS
¶1

On September 9, 2003, the New York Daily News reported that the Recording Industry Association

of America (“RIAA”) brought suit against Brianna LaHara, a twelve-year-old Catholic school honor student
residing in Manhattan.2 Brianna utilized Kazaa3 to download numerous copyrighted songs. Brianna’s
mother, Sylvia Torres, eventually settled with the RIAA for $2000.00. As a single mother, Sylvia should
certainly feel that her honor student daughter now knows more about copyright than before. Although the
lesson in copyright law should not have cost $2000.00, the RIAA hopes that its heavy-handed methods and
teachings will strike fear into the pirating community. Similar cases and suits involving unsuspecting, as well
as intentional, digital pirates are being reported throughout the nation. The reason for so many lawsuits stems
from the tremendous number of illegal downloads taking place. The technology acting as a conduit for illegal
downloading is provided by the various Peer-to-Peer (“P2P”) programs available to would-be pirates. The
company responsible for creating KaZaa stated that 230 million copies of KaZaa have been downloaded for
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free.4 Given the recent and excessive damage already sustained by the music industry, the RIAA must now
implement a final option: individualized enforcement of copyrights. Other options, including sitting idly as
pirates usurp copyrighted music and adopting educational campaigns (to convince people that paying for
music is somehow better than acquiring music free of charge), do not seem to be working very well. Given
that neither inaction nor education seem to deter Internet users from illegally downloading copyrighted music,
the RIAA has been tracking numerous pirates and filing suits against them.

CONDUITS TO THE INTERNET
¶2

The RIAA has taken control of enforcing copyright laws because no other party or person is doing so.

In fact, certain parties not only provide conduits for the pirates into the digital realm, but they also delay
potential copyright enforcement claims by shielding the pirates from judicial sight and grasp. The main
conduits include college campuses and Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”). In one month alone, the RIAA
filed 871 subpoenas in United States District Court in Washington D.C., demanding that universities and ISPs
provide the RIAA with personal information about the users of PSP networks, such as KaZaa.5

Universities
¶3

Because of the academic need for extensive high speed Internet connection on campuses, college

institutions inadvertently foster widespread P2P file-sharing and downloading of copyrighted music, movies,
video games and software off the Internet. College campuses have been targets of RIAA and music industry
subpoenas demanding the identities of the infringers the RIAA plans to sue.6 Some colleges have delayed the
enforcement measures of the DMCA by claiming procedural violations. Boston College and Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (“MIT”) filed motions to quash the subpoenas filled by the RIAA, arguing that the
subpoenas were served in Boston, more than 100 miles away from where they were filed in federal court in
Washington, D.C.7 Boston College and MIT opposed the subpoenas based on Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which states in pertinent part, “a subpoena may be served at any place within the district of the
court by which it is issued, or at any place without the district that is within 100 miles of the place . . .
specified in the subpoena . . . .”8 Although colleges and universities have an interest in protecting the private
information of their students and faculty, these institutions should also take measures to prevent piracy on
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their computer networks because of their own reliance on copyright laws to protect their academic products.9
For example, colleges retain copyright ownership in works produced by individuals as part of the employee’s
job. These works include computer software developed by a staff member from Computing Services, articles
written for alumni and faculty magazines, or other publications written by the Office of Publications.

Internet Service Providers
¶4

Another critical source of Internet connection allowing copyright infringement include ISPs. The

RIAA has targeted the greater part of the subpoenas towards private ISPs, such as Comcast and Verizon
Communications (“Verizon”), whose patrons download copyrighted material through their home personal
computers. At the end of 2002, RIAA demanded that Verizon identify one of its customers accused of
swapping music files and violating copyright laws. Following a challenge by Verizon, District Judge Bates
ordered Verizon to release the identity of the Verizon customer suspected of pirating copyrighted music.10
The importance of the Verizon case lies in its status as a test case for the DMCA subpoena power, a power
affirmed by the District Court, which allows music companies to require ISPs to release the names of their
customers suspected of violating copyright laws.11 Verizon appealed the decision, but the holding should be
affirmed because copyright laws clearly state that copyright owners have a right to obtain the identity of the
infringer for the purposes of enforcing copyright protection.12

COPYRIGHT LAW
¶5

An underlying purpose of copyright law, as with other forms of intellectual property law, is to support

artistic endeavors by allowing artists to benefit from their creations.13 The justification for providing a
“special reward” (monetary incentives) for artists and creators to continue to create lies in the enrichment of
public well-being through the sharing and enjoyment of the “products of their genius . . . .”14 The ultimate
source of copyright law stems from the Constitution and flows through the legislature: “The Congress shall
have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited times to
Authors and Inventors the Exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”15 Congress has
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subsequently created and instituted various other forms of copyright law, such as the Copyright Act of 1976.16
The Copyright Act laid out the five exclusive bundles of rights for authors: (1) reproduction, (2) adaptation,
(3) distribution, (4) performance, and (5) display.17 The Copyright Act has been amended to include the
DMCA.

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
¶6

Congress enacted the DMCA on October 28, 1998 during the 105th Congress with the purpose of

facilitating the “robust development and world-wide expression of electronic commerce, communications,
research, development, and education.”18 Although the DMCA was meant to protect and foster electronic and
digital developments, Congress realized that Internet intellectual property developments would be stifled if
claims of copyright infringement fell upon the conduits of e-commerce, the ISPs.19 For example, ISPs would
be subject to claims of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. In this sense, a chief purpose for
enacting the DMCA was eliminating the possibility of bringing copyright infringement claims against ISPs
for simply transmitting information over the Internet.
¶7

In order to prevail under contributory or vicarious infringement, a plaintiff must show “direct

infringement by a third party.”20 A prima facie case of “direct infringement” can be shown by the plaintiff by
establishing ownership of the infringed material and showing that the alleged infringers infringed on at least
one of the exclusive rights stated in 17 U.S.C. § 106.21 After the plaintiff establishes direct infringement and
wishes to pursue a claim for contributory infringement, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew or
had reason to know of direct infringement, and induced, caused, or materially contributed to the
infringement.22 If the plaintiff wishes to pursue a claim of vicarious liability against the defendant, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant had the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and a direct
financial interest in such activity.23 The music industry successfully shut down Napster, a centralized server,
by invoking the doctrines of vicarious and contributory liability.24 Even though the music industry shut down
Napster, illegal downloading of music continues to this day and in ever larger numbers since the development
of P2P technology. P2P technology allows users to share files directly between individuals without the use of
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a centralized server, thereby circumventing the possibility of secondary liability suits falling upon the P2P
networks.25 But ISPs, as conduits of both legal and illegal file-sharing, may face secondary liability suits.
¶8

Luckily for ISPs, the DMCA provides relief from the possibility of secondary liability suits. The

DMCA amended Chapter 5 of the Copyright Act, creating § 512, “Limitations on Liability relating to material
online.” To combat the potentially damaging effect of direct, vicarious and contributory infringement that
may fall upon ISPs and the Internet industry in general, Congress drafted the DMCA to limit the liability of
ISPs for copyright infringement committed by their customers using the provider’s systems or networks.26
Under certain conditions, the DMCA affords copyright infringement immunity for ISPs by offering
“monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory [copyright] infringement.”27 These “safe harbor”
provisions will protect an ISP from claims of infringement if the ISP (1) does not have actual or constructive
knowledge of the infringement, (2) does not benefit financially from the infringement, and (3) acts promptly
upon notice of infringing material to remove, or prevent access to, the infringing material.28 The “safe
harbor” provisions do not necessarily require ISPs to seek copyright infringers, but do impose strong
incentives upon ISPs to work with copyright owners.29 Under § 512(i) of the DMCA, copyright holders can
notify ISPs of infringing activities and ask courts to order the termination of infringing user’s accounts.30 In
exchange for assisting copyright owners in identifying pirates who use the ISPs as avenues for infringement,
ISPs are given protections against liability from copyright holders.31 In order to receive protection from
liability, ISPs must comply with a subpoena process which allows copyright holders to identify and pursue
legal actions against pirates.32 Specifically, § 512 allows copyright holders to issue subpoenas to ISPs
demanding the name, address and telephone numbers of ISP subscribers suspected of illegally downloading
copyrighted material.33 The subpoenas can be filed prior to any claims of infringement, are not subject to
judiciary review, nor require the alleged infringer to receive notice or opportunity to be heard. For these
reasons, Verizon has challenged the subpoena powers of the DMCA.

THE VERIZON CASE
¶9

Until recently, the music industry avoided suing direct individual infringers for sharing copyrighted

materials because of the tremendous cost and potentially disastrous publicity associated with filing lawsuits
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against individual users.34 However, the increase in illegal file sharing has forced copyright holders to sue
individuals in order to protect copyright and the survival of the music industry. In order to bring a suit, a
defendant must be identified.
¶10

On July 24, 2002, RIAA served a subpoena on Verizon Internet Services, Inc., seeking the identity of

an anonymous copyright infringer allegedly using Verizon’s network to impermissibly swap over 600
copyrighted files through P2P software provided by KaZaA.35 The subpoena included a request for the user’s
specified Internet Protocol (“IP”) address to enable Verizon to locate the computer where the infringements
occurred. In addition to providing the time and date of the downloaded file, RIAA provided a declaration
under penalty of perjury stating that the RIAA sought the identifying information in good faith and would use
the information for the sole purpose of protecting the copyright of RIAA members.36 Instead of providing the
identifying information of the infringing user, Verizon refused compliance with RIAA’s subpoena, stating
that the subpoena powers of the DMCA did not apply to Verizon.37 The issue surrounding the Verizon case,
in essence, entailed “statutory interpretation relating to the scope of the subpoena authority under the
DMCA.”38
¶11

Under the DMCA safe harbor provisions, § 512(a)-(d), ISPs are given monetary, injunctive, and

equitable relief from copyright infringement liablility. § 512(a), “Transitory digital network
communications,” provides ISPs with relief from liability “for infringement of copyright by reason of the
provider’s transmitting, routing or providing connections . . . or by reason of the intermediate and transient
storage of that material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or providing connections . . . .”39 § 512(c),
“Information Residing on systems or networks at direction of users,” provides ISPs with relief from liability
“for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage . . . of materials that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider . . . .”40 In return for relief from liability, ISPs must abide
by the DMCA subpoena power under § 512(h), which allows a copyright owner or person authorized to act on
the owner’s behalf to seek the identity of an alleged infringer by requesting the clerk of any United States
district court to issue a subpoena to a service provider.41 The proposed subpoena must contain, “a copy of a
notification . . . ,” and a sworn declaration stating that the subpoena will be used for the purpose of obtaining
the identity of the alleged infringer and protecting the rights of the copyright holder.42 Once issued, the
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subpoena authorizes and requires the ISP to “expeditiously disclose” information sufficient to identify the
alleged infringer.43
¶12

Verizon's argument for not responding to the subpoena was based on the notion that it did not store

any of the infringing user's files on its system; Verizon merely transmitted the allegedly infringing material.44
Verizon argued that subsection (h) subpoena authority does not extend to subsection (a), dealing with
transitory conduits, but is instead limited to subsection (c), providers that actively store allegedly infringing
material.45 Verizon viewed the DMCA’s subpoena power as applying to Verizon only if the infringed
material is stored or controlled by Verizon under subsection (c).46 More specifically, Verizon stated that the
infringed contents did not “reside on any system or network controlled or operated by or for [Verizon], but . .
. are stored on the hardware of the Customer.”47 Verizon posited that since it only provided the alleged
infringer with Internet connection and only transmitted the allegedly infringing material, Verizon’s status fell
under § 512(a) dealing with passive conduits, not under § 512(c) which deals with providers that store
allegedly infringing material.48 Therefore, Verizon contended, the subpoena power of subsection (h) did not
apply because subsection (h) was limited to service providers storing material under subsection (c).49
¶13

RIAA simply argued that the DMCA subpoena power under § 512(h) applies to all service providers

within the provisions of subsections (a) through (d), regardless of whether the infringing material is stored on
or simply transmitted over the service provider’s network.50 Verizon’s refusal to comply with the subpoena
prompted RIAA to move the court pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(6) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B) to
enforce the subpoena.51

Court’s Holding
¶14

In Verizon, the Court relied heavily on the legislative history of the DMCA, stating that Congress

intended to create a tradeoff for ISPs through the DMCA in which the ISPs would receive “liability
protections in exchange for assisting copyright owners in identifying and dealing with infringers . . . ”52 The
Court then rejected Verizon’s arguments and held that the subpoena power in 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) applied to
“all Internet service providers within the scope of the DMCA, not just to those service providers storing
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information on a system or network at the direction of a user.53 The Court found Verizon’s position to be
lacking because it would “create a huge loophole in Congress’ effort to prevent copyright infringement on the
Internet.”54 The District Court granted RIAA’s motion to enforce its subpoena and ordered Verizon to
comply with the subpoena.55
John Doe Actions
¶15
The Court also rejected Verizon’s call for John Doe actions in regards to claims against anonymous
copyright infringers. Verizon suggested that as an alternative, RIAA should bring “John Doe” actions in
federal court to obtain information identifying copyright infringers.56 In “John Doe” actions, the copyright
owner files a complaint against John Doe, the anonymous infringer. A third-party subpoena would then be
issued and served upon the ISP pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. The ISP would then notify
their anonymous customer, John Doe, of the impending lawsuit.57 Verizon argued that such procedures would
offer both procedural and substantive protections in favor of the customer’s rights, as well as providing the
ISP the opportunity to quash the subpoena.58 The Court rejected Verizon’s procedural substitution and stated
that John Doe actions would over burden the courts due to the vastness of copyright piracy on the Internet.59
The Court added that John Doe actions would delay and undermine the copyright holder’s ability to prevent
and enforce their copyrights.60

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DMCA SUBPOENA POWER
¶16

The Court noted that several amici curiae raised a number of possible issues involving the

constitutionality of the DMCA subpoena powers. Ironically, Verizon never explicitly raised the constitutional
issues. The Court stated that it was “wary of considering such issues”61 but took it upon itself to address and
settle the issue of the right to anonymous free speech within the Internet, stating that although there exists a
constitutional right to remain anonymous in free speech, Verizon’s customers who file-share copyrighted
music are not using the Internet to express ideas.62 The constitutional right to remain anonymous protects
“those ‘who support causes anonymously’ and those who ‘fear economic or official retaliation,’ ‘social
ostracism,’ or unwanted intrusion into ‘privacy.’”63
53
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The DMCA and Anonymity
¶17

Although the District Court in Verizon touched upon the notion of “unwanted intrusion into privacy”

in its opinion, the Court never addressed the privacy rights of the anonymous copyright infringers.64 Since
Verizon never raised these constitutional challenges in the case, RIAA did not brief the constitutional issues
raised in the amicus briefs. However, proponents of privacy and anonymity on the Internet were unreceptive
to the Court’s rejection of John Doe actions. Proponents, such as Peter Swire who served in the Clinton
Administration as Chief Counselor for Privacy and is currently a Professor of Law at the Moritz College of
Law at Ohio State University, argue that the subpoena powers of the DMCA violate due process as well as
privacy rights of individuals beyond the Internet because the identity of Internet users becomes available to
almost anyone.65 Swire predicts that the DMCA subpoena power will undermine and cause a chilling effect
to First Amendment rights on the Internet because abusers of the DMCA subpoena powers can track
identifying information back to anyone posting material on the Internet.66 Furthermore, Swire predicts that
putting the subpoena power in the hands of those without legitimate claims of copyright infringement will
flood the federal courts with fraudulent requests, thereby making illegitimate claims indistinguishable from
legitimate ones.67 Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, a joint project by the Electronic Frontier Foundation and
clinics of Harvard, Stanford, Berkeley, University of San Francisco, and University of Maine law schools,
administered a searchable database for determining whether DMCA subpoenas and “Cease and Desist” letters
were falsely or fraudulently issued to Internet users.68 One example of an erroneous letter that Verizon
heavily relies on involves an incident in which MediaForce, a security firm which searches for P2P nets for
copyrighted works, acted on behalf of RIAA member Warner Brothers and sent a notice to an ISP, alleging
copyright infringement of the film “Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone.”69 The notice stated that
MediaForce had a good faith belief that copyright infringement took place at a particular Internet Protocol
address. The notice demanded that the service provider terminate the account of the person who had posted
the alleged infringing material, which turned out to be a child’s book report.70 Other examples include claims
made by the Church of Scientology aimed to remove links to websites written by individuals who publish
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criticisms against the Church of Scientology and trademark claims made under the guise of copyright to take
advantage of the DMCA (which applies solely to copyright).71
¶18

Proponents of Verizon’s stance argue that the tremendous influx of “legally sanctioned harassment”

will mirror that of “spam . . . limitless as the Internet itself.”72 For example, website operators would be able
to identify their visitors for purposes such as marketing, stalking, and identity theft.73 Verizon and its
supporters also speculate that the DMCA subpoena power may extend to illegitimate claims of copyright,
allowing “those who wish to silence their critics, retaliate against whistle-blowers, target purveyors of
abortion literature, harass those who share politically damaging memos, stalk sexually-explicit photographers,
remove personally embarrassing material, or accomplish other nefarious ends will use the DMCA subpoena
process to un-mask their perceived foes.”74 In this sense, Verizon argues that the subpoena powers granted
in § 512(h) are overly broad and will have chilling effect on the free speech of Internet users who wish to
engage in legal activity but do not because they are scared that they will be subpoenaed.75 More specifically,
Verizon posited the possibility that copyright owners would wrongfully pursue and obtain the identity of noninfringing anonymous Internet users, thus discouraging Internet users from engaging in otherwise protected
activity.76
¶19

The threat of superfluous suits and illegitimate claims of copyright infringement should not disturb

the privacy rights of individuals because the DMCA contains provisions designed to prevent such illicit
intrusions. In the Verizon Second Subpoena Decision, the District Court noted that DMCA § 512(h) provides
protection for Internet users against “baseless or abusive subpoenas.”77 Not only is the subpoena applicant
required to submit a notification similar to that of an actual copyright infringement complaint, but the
subpoena applicant must also submit a sworn declaration stating that the subpoena and the identifying
information obtained will “only be used for the purpose of protecting rights under [Title 17].”78 These
procedural safeguards aim to deter superfluous claims from reaching the courts. Furthermore, the anecdotal
examples of fraudulent claims offered by Swire and Verizon do not require the invocation of the overbreadth
doctrine. Verizon correctly pointed out the erroneous complaint in the “Harry Potter” incident; however,
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Verizon incorrectly associated this error with the “notice-and-takedown” procedure of § 512(c)(3) instead of
the subpoena section at issue, § 512(h).79 The “Harry Potter” incident, as well as the other examples
erroneous notices, involve notices that were served pursuant to § 512(c)(3) requesting ISPs to remove
copyrighted material located on its servers.80 Unlike § 512(h), a user’s identity is not called for when a
copyright owner invokes § 512(c)(3).81
¶20

Although the notions of fraudulent subpoenas and abuses of the DMCA are indeed worrisome, §

512(h) is not overly broad as Verizon and Swire predict because there is little proof of overbreadth and “the
mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it
susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.”82 In Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the
Supreme Court held that the overbreadth of a statute must be “real” and “substantial” in order to fail
constitutional muster.83 As the Supreme Court noted in ACLU, “anecdotes” of “questionable relevance to the
matter at hand and certainly do not constitute a sufficient basis for invalidating a federal statute.”84 Indeed,
the possibility of “legally sanctioned harassment”85 should not constitute a prevalent part of daily internet use,
but at this point, everyday illegal downloading and copyright infringement certainly overrides any prediction
or anecdote offered by advocates of internet privacy. Furthermore, advocates of Internet privacy should not
alarm themselves, or others, too much in regards to fraudulent issuances of subpoenas seeking identifying
information from Internet users because courts will not tolerate false subpoenas.86

Privacy
¶21

Internet users should not be so alarmed by the fact that there is not 100% privacy on the Internet.

Many Internet users find countless spam e-mails in their e-mail inbox everyday. Although senders of spam
do not necessarily know the personal identity of those receiving such junk e-mail, ISPs certainly do. NetZero,
an ISP, admits in their “Privacy Statement” that their customers are targets of customized advertisements.87
Specifically, NetZero customers are given notice that NetZero will collect information about the users and
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then disclose that information to advertisers.88 Although this privacy matter involving NetZero differs from
the present case involving Verizon, the common theme among all ISPs is that they all have access to the
identifying information of their customers. Therefore, if an Internet user wishes to remain completely
anonymous within the Internet, they must face the disappointing realization that their conduits into the
Internet also act as the conduits into their personal information.
¶22

A District Court case, McVeigh v. Cohen,89 demonstrated the notion that ISP customers will

sometimes suffer the invasion of privacy by third parties and even by their ISPs. In McVeigh, plaintiff Senior
Chief Timothy McVeigh sued America On-Line (“AOL”) for the unauthorized disclosure of his personal
information and sought to enjoin the United States Navy from discharging him based on his alleged
homosexual conduct, a dischargeable offense.90 After suspecting McVeigh of admitting homosexual conduct
via the Internet, Lieutenant Karin S. Morean, a member of the Judge Advocate General's ("JAG") Corps,
investigated the matter and requested a Navy paralegal to contact AOL and obtain the identification of an
AOL subscriber who went under the screen name “boysrch.”91 The profile of “boysrch” included homosexual
interests such as “collecting pics of other young studs” and “boy watching.”92 The profile did not contain any
identifying information, such as the name, address, or phone number.93 Before speaking to the plaintiff or
requesting a warrant or court order, the Navy received affirmative indication from an AOL representative that
the screen name “boysrch” belonged to the plaintiff.94 Subsequently, the Navy sought to discharge McVeigh
for violating the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue” policy.95 In McVeigh, the Court evaluated the case
under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"), which Congress enacted to address
privacy concerns on the Internet and allow the government to obtain personal information about individuals
from online service providers.96 The Court in McVeigh held the Navy could have legally obtained the
information of “boysrch” from AOL, but only if the Navy (a) obtained a warrant issued under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure or state equivalent, or (b) gave prior notice to the online subscriber and then
issued a subpoena or received a court order authorizing disclosure of the information in question.97 Since the
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Navy did not perform either requirement prior to obtaining “boysrch’s” identification, the Court granted
McVeigh’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and reinstated McVeigh into the Navy.98
¶23

Advocates of Internet privacy should not be shocked by the fact that third parties may obtain personal

information from their ISPs. As McVeigh exemplifies, the subpoena power of the DMCA is not a novel
instrument for obtaining the personal information of Internet users. Previous statutes enacted by Congress,
such as the ECPA, illustrate the foresight of Congress to predict situations requiring the privacy rights of
individuals to be encroached upon due to legal violations or infringements upon the rights of others. And
given the noticeable lack of cases like McVeigh, the floodgates of false subpoenas seem to be fairly water
tight.

VERIZON’S APPEAL SHOULD NOT SUCCEED
¶24

In April of 2003, the District Court of D.C. denied Verizon’s request for a stay and ordered the

company to comply with RIAA’s subpoena.99 Verizon then turned over the names of the copyright infringers
but continues to appeal the matter.100 Verizon is appealing the decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, contending that the decision of the District Court would “open the floodgates of
copyright holder,”101 thereby undermining Internet user’s confidence in the privacy of their Internet
communications.102 As a result, Verizon contends that consumer interest in broadband, an interest that the
federal government has also pursued, would cease.103 During the hearings on appeal, Verizon’s counsel,
Andrew McBride, argued that since the DMCA was written prior to Napster related copyright infringements
in 1999, the DMCA was never intended to give copyright owners unrestrained access to the identities of
Internet customers who use file-sharing services.104 Don Verrilli, arguing on behalf of RIAA, countered
Verizon’s argument during the hearings and stated that Congress incorporated the subpoena power
intentionally because Congress understood that copyright holders needed an effective tool to locate and
identify the “digital thieves” stealing copyrighted material.105
¶25

The subpoena power should be upheld on appeal because the rampant piracy occurring over the

Internet must cease. The music industry and the RIAA need the subpoena power to identify the numerous
music pirates because the only ones who can pinpoint music pirates are the service providers. The RIAA
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admits that it does not want to resort to litigation, but in order to protect a product that is “regularly stolen,”106
the copyright holder must take appropriate actions so as to prevent the downfall of their livelihoods. Even
though the large record companies, whom much of the public disfavors, are experiencing the pains of piracy,
smaller and independent parties and copyright holders, such as artists, songwriters, and everyone associated
with the music industry, must also fight for their survival.107 As the number of lawsuits and DMCA subpoena
increase, Internet consumers must realize that the music industry is not attacking their privacy rights or
attempting to gather personal information for the sake of mass marketing. Instead, Internet consumers must
realize that the violations of copyright laws stemming from illegal downloading of copyrighted music have
reached a critical stage. The large number of notices served and subpoenas issued does not indicate a problem
with the subpoena powers of the DMCA. Rather, the large number of notices served and subpoenas issued
reflects the immensity of the “piracy epidemic.”108 Unless stringent anti-piracy efforts, such as the
identification of digital copyright pirates, continue on behalf of the artists that the Constitution specifically
aims to protect, the sea of copyright will continue to be pillaged by those who seek to steal the fruits of
creative and productive geniuses. If this wave of piracy does not cease or at least become deterred, the
livelihoods of all those in the music industry will be washed away.
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